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REGIONAL SECURITY ISSUES
LATEST STATEMENTS, BRIEFINGS, AND HEARINGS

Regional Security

Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Missiles: Status and Trends

Congressional Research Service (via OpenCRS), August 25th, 2008

The United States has long recognized the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, and missiles. This report, which analyzes NBC weapons programs potential threat patterns around the globe, is updated as needed. The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in the world is shrinking as the major powers scale back their inventories through unilateral reductions and arms control, but other countries and groups still try to acquire these weapons.

There are five established nuclear weapon states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). India and Pakistan declared their nuclear weapons capability with nuclear tests in 1998, as did North Korea in 2006. Israel is also widely believed to have a nuclear weapon arsenal. About a dozen countries have offensive biological weapons (BW) programs, and the same number have chemical weapons (CW) programs. That number could grow, as new technologies are developed and the international flow of information, goods, expertise, and technology continues.

While the United States and Russia eliminated intermediate-range missiles and are reducing their intercontinental missile inventories, China is modernizing and expanding its missile force. North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, and Pakistan are building short- and medium-range missiles and are developing longer-range missiles. Dozens of countries have or are developing short-range ballistic missiles and more are likely to buy them. Over 80 countries have cruise missiles; about 40 manufacture or have the ability to manufacture them. And terrorists continue their efforts to acquire NBC capabilities. Elements in North Korea, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, and other countries continue to export weapons technology.

The potential for secondary proliferation markets has grown, and concern about the ability of individual actors like the Pakistani nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, to peddle nuclear technology has grown considerably. The number of countries or groups that will acquire or produce NBC weapons may decrease if diplomacy, arms control treaties, nonproliferation regimes, and security and assistance strategies are effective. NBC weapons and missiles will remain a potential threat for the foreseeable future, but most observers readily agree that, even if nonproliferation policies alone are insufficient to halt NBC programs, such measures can slow those programs until states are persuaded that NBC weapons are not in their national security interest. http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL30699_20080220.pdf

Nuclear Cooperation with Other Countries: A Primer
Congressional Research Service, August 12, 2008

In order for the United States to engage in civilian nuclear cooperation with other states, it must conclude a framework agreement that meets specific requirements under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act (AEA). The AEA also provides for exemptions to these requirements, export control licensing procedures, and criteria for terminating cooperation. Congressional review is required for section 123 agreements; the AEA establishes special “fast track” parliamentary procedures by which Congress may act on a proposed agreement.
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RS22937.pdf

National Defense Strategy
U.S. Department of Defense, June 2008

We face a global struggle. Like communism and fascism before it, extremist ideology has transnational pretensions, and like its secular antecedents, it draws adherents from around the world. The vision it offers is in opposition to globalization and the expansion of freedom it brings. Paradoxically, violent extremist movements use the very instruments of globalization – the unfettered flow of information and ideas, goods and services, capital, people, and technology – that they claim to reject to further their goals. Although driven by this transnational ideology, our adversaries themselves are, in fact, a collection of regional and local extremist groups. Regional and local grievances help fuel the conflict, and it thrives in ungoverned, under-governed, and mis-governed areas.
This conflict is a prolonged irregular campaign, a violent struggle for legitimacy and influence over the population. The use of force plays a role, yet military efforts to capture or kill terrorists are likely to be subordinate to measures to promote local participation in government and economic programs to spur development, as well as efforts to understand and address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies. For these reasons, arguably the most important military component of the struggle against violent extremists is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we help prepare our partners to defend and govern themselves.
Working with and through local actors whenever possible to confront common security challenges is the best and most sustainable approach to combat violent extremism. Often our partners are better positioned to handle a given problem because they understand the local geography, social structures, and culture better than we do or ever could. In collaboration with interagency and international partners we will assist vulnerable states and local populations as they seek to ameliorate the conditions that foster extremism and dismantle the structures that support and allow extremist groups to grow.
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/2008%20National%20Defense%20Strategy.pdf (29 pages)

Reflections on Leadership
ROBERT GATES, Secretary of Defense
Parameters, Summer 2008

"Conner’s axiom—never fight unless you have to—looms over policy discussions today regarding rogue nations like Iran that support terrorism;
that is a destabilizing force throughout the Middle East and Southwest Asia and, in my judgment, is hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. Another war in the Middle East is the last thing we need. In fact, I believe it would be disastrous on a number of levels. The military option must be kept on the table, given the destabilizing policies of the regime and the risks inherent in a future Iranian nuclear threat, either directly or through nuclear proliferation.
Then there is the threat posed by violent jihadist networks. The doctrine of preemption has been criticized in many quarters, but it is an answer to
legitimate questions.With the possibility of proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical materials, and the willingness of terrorists to use them without warning, can we wait to respond until after a catastrophic attack is either imminent or has already occurred? Given the importance of public opinion and public support, how does one justify military action to prevent something that might happen tomorrow or several years down the road? While “never fight unless you have to” does not preclude preemption, after our experience with flawed information regarding Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, how high must the threshold of confidence in our intelligence have to be to justify at home and abroad a preemptive or preventive war?"
http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/08summer/gates.pdf (9 pages)

Middle East

Terrorism

Foreign Aid and the Fight Against Terrorism and Proliferation: Leveraging Foreign Aid to Achieve U.S. Policy Goals
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, July 31, 2008

Witnesses:
The Honorable Dell L. Dailey, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State

It is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss how the USG can better leverage foreign assistance to counter terrorism (CT). My colleague, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation, Patricia McNerney, will address the same issue vis a vis proliferation…..
Since September 11, 2001 we have had several years of kinetic, short-term activity. The international community has captured or killed numerous senior operatives in al-Qaida and its network, and has thus degraded the ability of terrorists to plan and mount attacks. But let me make one thing clear: short term capture and kill efforts only buy us time to accomplish our long term goals.
The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT) has oversight for four U.S. foreign assistance programs that are funded through the
“Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs” (NADR) account: The Antiterrorism Assistance Program (ATA), Counterterrorism Finance (CTF), Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification, Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (TIP/PISCES), and the Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE) program.
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/dai073108.pdf (7 page full testimony)

*** Ms. Patricia McNerney, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation, U.S. Department of State
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/mcn073108.pdf (14 page full testimony)

Mr. Steven Emerson, Executive Director, The Investigative Project on Terrorism
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/eme073108.pdf (56 pages)

Mr. Douglas Farah, Senior Investigator, Nine Eleven Finding Answers Foundation, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and Strategy Center
http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/110/far073108.pdf (8 pages)

Iraq

Iran

International Meeting on Next Generation Safeguards
Patricia McNerney, Acting Assistant Secretary for International Security and Nonproliferation
Presentation to Panel One: Designing Safeguards for the Future, Washington, DC, September 11, 2008

The IAEA also plays a critical role in countering proliferation threats, especially through its vigorous investigations into suspicious nuclear activity. The most prominent example is, of course, Iran. One key means to enhance and solidify the IAEA’s capabilities in this area would be universal adoption of the Additional Protocol. Admittedly, the Additional Protocol levies further requirements on the IAEA, but far more important are the tools it gives the Agency to uncover illicit nuclear activity. We have made progress over the past several years – 60 percent of IAEA member states now have an Additional Protocol in force. But that is not enough.

In February 2004, President Bush proposed an amendment to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines to make the Additional Protocol a condition of supply. While that has not happened yet, we continue to work with partners – both suppliers and recipients of nuclear technology – on how to encourage wider adoption of the Additional Protocol. In that regard, we well understand the importance of the United States and other leading nuclear suppliers having their own Additional Protocols in force; we hope to meet the necessary conditions for U.S. ratification by the end of this year.
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/rm/109981.htm

Updated: September 22, 2008